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Abstract
I model the risk that borrowers will not renew their loans from a microlender in
Bolivia. Exit risk is greater for newer borrowers, women, manufacturers, and those with
more past arrears. Risk also depends on the amount disbursed, the loan officer and the
branch, and the time since the first loan. Although the knowledge of quantitative
characteristics cannot replace knowledge of qualitative character, the model predicts
well enough out-of-sample to help lenders to know where investments in relationships
with specific borrowers are most likely to curb the risk of exit most.
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1. Introduction
In high-income countries, credit-card lenders judge risk with statistical models
based on a few simple traits such as home ownership, income from formal wage
employment, and past repayment as recorded by a credit bureau (Mester, 1997;
Lawrence, 1992). Credit-scoring allows credit-card lenders to make massive numbers of
small, uncollateralized loans each day without the costs of individual evaluations of
risk. According to Lewis (1990, p. 138), scoring “is a standard procedure almost
anywhere credit is granted on a large scale.”
Like credit-card lenders in high-income countries, microlenders in low-income
countries make massive numbers of small, short, unsecured loans. Borrowers from
microlenders cannot get other formal loans because they do not have traditional
collateral nor formal wage employment and thus cannot signal their risk in ways that
lenders can process at a low cost. As far as I know, however, no microlender uses
credit-scoring even though the central tasks of microlenders are the same as those of
scoring models: to judge risk, to detect factors that affect risk, and to design contracts
and policies to control risk.
Can scoring help microlenders? To find an answer, I model the risk of exit by
borrowers from a microlender in Bolivia. Borrowers exit when they do not get a new
loan after they repay their old one. Exit is greater for new borrowers, women,
manufacturers, and those with more past arrears. Risk also depends on the time since2
the first loan, the amount disbursed, and the loan officer and branch. In out-of-sample
tests, the model here predicts much better than a naïve model.
Scoring can help microlenders, but the knowledge of a few simple quantitative
characteristics cannot substitute completely for the knowledge of qualitative character
and cash flows that loan officers build through long-term close contact with borrowers.
Still, the results here suggest that scoring can help to detect high-risk cases. A
microlender could use the model, for example, to ask loan officers to pay an extra visit
to those borrowers with the highest predicted risk of exit.
Section 2 below discusses the problems and prospects of scoring for microlenders.
Section 3 describes microlending in Bolivia, the data, and the model. Section 4 reports
the statistical results, and Section 5 tests out-of-sample prediction. Section 6 concludes
the paper.3
2. Microlending and scoring
Microlenders have not adopted scoring so far for four reasons. First, low-income
countries lack credit bureaux, and most borrowers of microlenders are self-employed. In
credit-card models, the credit record and wage employment are the strongest predictive
factors. Second, many risks faced by the self-employed poor are not highly correlated
with simple-to-observe personal traits. Scoring requires at least some correlation. Third,
the best microlenders predict risk from subjective knowledge of borrowers acquired by
loan officers through repeated close contact. In contrast, scoring starts from the premise
that risk can be predicted from objective traits that a stranger can observe in a one-
shot contact. Fourth, most microlenders are young, small, and growing. Scoring requires
data from a big, stable population. These stylized facts of microlenders limit the
maximum possible effectiveness of scoring but do not preclude the possibility of some
effectiveness, albeit less than in high-income countries.
2.1 Strengths
Scoring has four strengths. First, it can cut the time to evaluate applications.
When predicted risk is very high or very low, management might summarily accept or
reject. More resources would go to borderline cases and to overrides where the loan
officer knows something that the model does not.
A second strength of scoring is to make risk more directly susceptible to policy.
For example, a lender who wants to expand might tell loan officers to loosen standards,4
but each officer will act on this in his or her own way. In contrast, a lender with a
scoring model could reduce the cut-off threshold a given number of percentage points
and know the likely increase in accepted applicants as well as the likely increase in risk.
Third, scoring can make judgements of risk more consistent, both inter-officer
and intra-officer. Automation may also reduce the wage bill because officers can be less
well-qualified and because apprenticeships can be shortened (Lewis, 1990). The wage
bill is a key factor in growth and profit for microlenders (Rhyne and Rotblatt, 1994).
Fourth and most important, scoring models can be tested. This soothes the fears
of managers and loan officers who doubt that a computer can help to do their job.
Microlenders took a long time to learn to judge the risk of small, short, unsecured
loans, and they have reason to be leery of attempts to graft a new part into a system
that works on fundamentally different principles.
2.1 Weaknesses
For microlenders, scoring has seven weaknesses. First, models degrade as niches
shift, competition changes, and policies evolve. Scoring assumes that the future will be
like the past, so it cannot predict what has not already happened many times. Thus
scoring will miss risk due to unprecedented changes in the market or in lender policy. It
also misses risk correlated with unobserved or unrecorded variables.
Second, scoring requires many cases of both good and bad outcomes. Many
microlenders are too small, too young, or too paper-based to have the data needed.5
Third, scoring technique, while simple, is not well-known. The firms that sell
models guard their trade secrets, so, except for Greene (1998 and 1992) and Boyes et al.
(1989), the academic literature is weak. Model development and implementation
requires skill not only in statistics and finance but also in project management.
Fourth, each lender needs its own model because each has its own niche and
technology. One size does not fit all.
Fifth, the use of traits such as sex, age, ethnicity, and marital status may be
unethical if not illegal. These traits are often excellent, inexpensive predictors of risk,
but of course it is unfair to judge people by traits that they did not choose.
Sixth, even if scoring can judge risk well, a lender may not have effective ways to
affect risk. For example, a lender may be powerless to convince a known high-risk
borrower not to exit. This is not a drawback of scoring itself; most lenders would prefer
to know risk and to have their hands tied than not to know risk at all.
In principle, both the problems and the prospects for scoring in microlending are
great. The rest of this paper tests scoring in practice for a Bolivian lender.6
3. A model of exit at a lender in Bolivia
This section describes the market for microlending in Bolivia, the data, and the
econometric model.
3.1 Microlending in Bolivia
Bolivia is the cradle of microlending in Latin America. Despite sparse
population—6 people per km
2—deep poverty, and rugged topography, microlending has
a very high rate of penetration (Navajas et al., 2000). Most Latin American countries
have, at most, one microlender with more than 10,000 active borrowers; Bolivia has a
dozen this big. Three have converted from unregulated not-for-profits to regulated for-
profits, and several more hope to convert soon. The lenders work in both rural and
urban areas and with both individuals and groups. In La Paz, most borrowers are near
the poverty line but are not among the poorest.
Profits attracted competition from Bolivian banks and from Chilean consumer-
finance companies. In the battle for market share, lenders started to advertise, to open
new branches, and to tempt borrowers from other lenders to switch. The pace
quickened in 1997; exit rates skyrocketed, and arrears doubled. Not only did tolerance
of arrears by the consumer-finance companies weaken the culture of repayment, but
borrowers also took loans from more than one lender. The economic crisis in Brazil in
1999 also affected repayment from the women traders who are the bulk of the
microlending portfolio in Bolivia.7
3.2 The data
The microlender studied here serves individuals in trade and manufacturing in
urban areas. It evaluates risk almost exclusively on the personal judgement of loan
officers; most loans are not collateralized, and a committee discusses only very big or
unusual loans. From birth in August 1988 until the end of 1996, the exit rate was 21
percent, defined as the number of borrowers who did not get new loans (8,490) divided
by the number of loans paid off (39,956). In the first nine months of 1997, the exit rate
jumped to 36 percent (3,761 exits from 10,555 loans repaid).
The data include the following for each loan disbursed through Sept. 31, 1997:
 Date of disbursement;
 Amount disbursed;
 Sex of borrower;
 Sector of firm;
 Type of guarantee;
 Number of past spells of arrears;
 Length of longest spell of past arrears;
 Branch;
 Loan officer;
 Whether the loan was outstanding on Dec. 31, 1996 or Sept. 30, 1997.
This list of variables is extremely short. At the least, most scoring models would
also include the age, education, and length of residence of the borrower; ownership of a
telephone, house, or car; and measures of the size and financial strength of the
household and firm. Thus this exercise is a conservative test: if a truncated model can
predict the risk of exit, then a full model might be even more powerful.8
3.3. The statistical model
The structural random-utility model follows Greene (1993). The unobserved (1 x
N) vector of expected benefits bb to borrowers of the choice to go bad (to exit) is a
linear function of an unobserved (k x 1) vector of coefficients b, an observed (k x N)
matrix of independent variables Ub, and an unobserved (1 x N) vector of errors b:
bb  

bUb  b. (1)
Likewise, the unobserved expected costs cb of the choice to go bad is
cb  

bWb  µb. (2)
The choice to stay good (to repeat) has expected benefits bg and expected costs
cg. Borrowers are observed to go bad (y = 1) when the unobserved net benefit of exiting
minus the net benefit of repeating (y
*) is positive:
y  1  y














The logit model assumes that  has a logistic distribution with mean zero and
variance one and a cumulative distribution function (z) = exp(z)/[1+exp(z)]. The
maximum-likelihood estimator chooses a (k x 1) vector 
* to maximize




Xi(2yi  1)]. (4)9
For borrower i, the estimated risk of exit E[yi] is 
* = (
*Xi). At the means of
the 1988-1996 sample, 
* = 0.1691. The change in the probability of exit due to a small
change in a continuous independent variable is E[y]/X = 
*(1*)
*. Dummy
variables are not continuous, but the estimated probability of exit due to a switch in a
dummy from 0 to 1 is usually quite close to the effect from the continuous formula.
A consistent estimate of the marginal effects replaces X with x ¯, a (1 x k) vector
of the sample means of the independent variables. Given a consistent estimate of V, the
(k x k) covariance matrix of 
*, the standard error of the effects is asymptotically
normal and is the square root of the diagonal of qVq, where  = [
*(1
*)]
2, q = I +
(12 
*)
*x ¯, and I is a (k x k) identity matrix. The analysis focuses not on the
estimated coefficients but rather on the marginal effects because estimated risk depends
non-linearly on all independent variables and on all estimated coefficients.
 The logit model avoids the weaknesses of the discriminant model used in most
published scoring models, including the only known scoring model for borrowers in a
bank aimed at the poor in a low-income country (Viganò, 1993). Besides its small
sample (n = 100), the model of Viganò has three drawbacks common to all
discriminant models (Eisenbeis, 1981). First, it makes the unlikely assumption that the
distribution of independent variables is joint-normal and differs between the good cases
and the bad cases only in the mean. Second, the estimated coefficients have no direct
interpretation. Third, discriminant models do not estimate risk as probabilities.10
4. Estimated effects
This section discusses the estimated effects on exit due to changes in
independent variables. Although microlenders want to predict the risk of exit, they also
want to know the factors that influence it to guide changes to technology and policy.
The model uses all loans paid off from August 1988 to the end of 1996. I used
loans paid off from Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 1997 to test out-of-sample prediction (Section 5).
The Chi-square statistic for comparison with a model with only an intercept was
significant at 0.0001. Of 120 estimated coefficients, 70 differed from zero with at least
90-percent probability. Statistical significance, however, does not necessarily imply
predictive power (Hand, 1994; Greene, 1993; Wiginton, 1980).
4.1 Experience of the borrower
4.1.1 Number of past loans
With a set of dummies for the number of past loans that the borrower has had,
my model is like a discrete-event hazard model with a non-parametric baseline
(Jenkins, 1995). Estimated logit coefficients for each stage, the estimated effects of
advancement, and standard errors and p-values are in Table 1.
The estimated coefficients are highly significant, and they become more negative
as the number of past loans increases (middle three columns of Table 1). Negative
coefficients tend to increase the probability of repeats (yi = 0), and positive coefficients
tend to increase the probability of exit (yi = 1). More past loans means less future exit.11
How big is the effect of an additional loan? The estimated changes in
probabilities (rightmost three columns of Table 1) are large and statistically significant.
Compared with a new borrower, a borrower with 10 loans or more is 30  11 = 19
percentage points less likely to exit. First-time borrowers are more likely to misjudge
the net gains of borrowing and thus to drop out after a quick test, and repeat borrowers
are less likely to want to start from scratch with a new lender.
4.1.2 Months since the first loan
The number of past loans does not capture all the nuances of experience because
a borrower might, for example, get three one-month loans or three one-year loans. I
measure time as a borrower with a set of dummies defined as the bounds on the integer
part of the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months since the first loan.
Most borrowers have 0-6 months of experience. Exit decreases for 7-19 months,
increases for 20-53 months, and increases even more for 54-147 months. Only this last
effect is both precise and large. Independent of the number of past loans, the risk of exit
increases with the time since the first loan. Why would this be? All first-time borrowers
want to borrow. As time passes, however, the chances that they want repeat loans must
decrease as the forces that affect their demand change.
4.2 Past arrears
I measure past arrears as the longest spell in days and as the number of spells in
the previous loan (Table 2). Spells of arrears were common, but most were very short.12
To avoid perfect collinearity with the number of past loans, I count first-time borrowers
as if they had no arrears in the past.
4.2.1 Longest spells
Compared with borrowers with no arrears, borrowers were less likely to exit if
their longest spell lasted 1-4 days and more likely if their longest spell lasted 5 days or
more. The effects are precise and large; one day of arrears decreases the probability of
exit by 6 percentage points, and 29 or more days increases it by 41 percentage points.
It makes sense that very long spells prompt exit—borrowers do not like the
anguish of delinquency and lenders do not like the costs of default. The lender does not,
however, have a rule to kick out all borrowers past some level of arrears. Still, some
borrowers who do not repeat are not drop-outs but kick-outs.
But why would a short spell be better than no spell at all? The result is not due
to counting first-time borrowers as having had no arrears in their non-existent previous
loan; the same pattern remains in a regression with just dummies for arrears.
The result may very well be due to data errors or to spurious correlations
between arrears, exit, and omitted variables, but it also may be real. There are
plausible stories why short spells of arrears might reduce exit more than no spells.
For example, 85 percent of loans had no spells longer than a week, and the
lender does not seem to worry about these very short spells. Some borrowers pay late
not because they cannot pay or do not want to pay but because they wait until they13
can combine a trip to the branch with other errands or because they need time to
collect cash from their own customers. Also, compared with borrowers nervous about
making each payment on time, borrowers who learn that they can pay a few days late
without punishment are more at ease with debt and thus more likely to get a new loan.
4.2.2 Number of spells
With length held constant, the number of spells of arrears has a large, precise,
and increasing effect on the risk of exit (Table 2). Compared to someone with no spells,
someone with nine or more spells is 16 percentage points more likely to exit. Even if all
spells are short, both borrower and lender want to avoid the costs of late repayments.
4.3 Sex and sector
Most loans went to women (Table 3), but women were 1 percentage point more
likely to exit than men. Traders, regardless of their sex, are 2 percentage points less
likely to exit than manufacturers. Changing sectors between loans had a similarly big
effect, but the estimate is imprecise and only 0.6 percent of borrowers switched sectors.
4.4 Amount disbursed
Exit might depend on the level, the increase, or the decrease in the amount
disbursed. In terms of constant dollars as of the end of 1998, each $100 disbursed
decreases risk by 0.2 percentage points (Table 3). Exit decreases by 0.7 percentage
points for each $100 increase between loans, where the increase is zero for first loans
and for loans smaller than the previous loan. A decrease of $100 increases risk by 0.114
percentage points. Big loans and bigger loans decrease exit. The lender, however, might
not want to adjust loan size to retain more borrowers because bigger loans have more
default risk and because the effects of loan size on exit are small. Also, the average loan
($700) and the average change ($140 for increases and $25 for decreases) are small.
4.5 Guarantees
None of the four guarantees accepted by the microlender has a large, precise
effect on exit (Table 3). Likewise, changes in the guarantee between loans have no
effect. Microlenders rely less on collateral than on the sixth sense of loan officers.
4.6 Loan officers
The heart of microlending is the relationship of the loan officer to the borrower.
Compared with “other” officers with less than 80 loans paid off, the best retainer
decreased exit by 14 percentage points, while the worst retainer increased exit by 13
percentage points (Table 4). Many effects are large and precise, and lenders may have
wide scope to influence them through incentive schemes and training.
Twelve percent of borrowers switch loan officers between loans, often because a
loan officer quits or is fired. This increases risk by 1 percentage point (Table 4).
Compared with new loan officers, exit is higher for officers with 2-6 months of
experience and still higher for 7-19 months (Table 5). Although some estimates are
imprecise, officers seem to take good care of their first customers but slacken as their15
portfolios expand. Once mature, officers seem to focus again on quality rather than
quantity, so risk falls for 20-53 months and still more for 54-147 months.
4.7 Branches
Some branches retain borrowers better than others (Table 5). Compared with
“other”—the central office and four small branches—the best retainer decreased exit by
23 percentage points, and the worst increased it by 3 percentage points. Lenders may
be able to influence risk at the branch level. This lender may also want to track
borrowers who switch branches because it increases exit by 4 percentage points.
4.8 Date of disbursement
To control for seasonal or one-shot changes in the market or lender policy, I
included a set of dummies for the year and month of disbursement. Exit in 1992-1996
was less than in 1988-1991, hitting bottom in 1994 and then increasing (Table 6). The
only precise month effect is a decrease in exit for loans disbursed in Bolivian winter.
In sum, exit risk depends mostly on borrower experience, past arrears, and the
loan officer and branch. The date of disbursement also has a big effect. Factors with
smaller effects include sex, sector, and the amount disbursed. Once a lender has
approved a new borrower, most of the most important factors—except for the effort and
skill of the branch and the loan officer—are beyond its scope of influence.16
5. Predictive power
The purpose of a scoring model is to predict risk outside the sample used to
make it, to use what is known of the past to guess what will happen in the future. Here,
I check how well the model built with 1988-96 data classifies borrowers who repaid
loans and then exited or repeated in the first nine months of 1997.
Cases with estimated risk above a threshold are classified as bads (exits), and
cases below it are classified as goods (repeats). Classification has four possible
outcomes. A true positive is when the model predicts a known good as good. Likewise, a
true negative is when the model predicts a known bad as bad. A false positive is a
known bad predicted as good, and a false negative is a known good predicted as bad.
The top four rows of Table 7 list the cases in each outcome for 11 thresholds. A
threshold of zero is an all-bad naïve model; estimated risk is always above the cut-off.
In the test sample, 3,761 (36 percent) were known bads (with a zero threshold, all true
negatives) and 6,794 (64 percent) were known goods (with a zero threshold, all false
negatives). As the threshold moves up, the number of true positives increases and the
number of false negatives decreases; however, false positives also increase, and true
negatives also decrease. A threshold of one is an all-good naïve model; estimated risk is
always below the cut-off. Because movements of the threshold trigger trade-offs among
the four outcomes, the optimal threshold depends on the gains and costs of mistakes
and of correct guesses and thus on the goals of the lender.17
5.1 Sample separation
Does the model separate goods from bads? One way to check is the population-
weighted probability distributions of estimated risk for known goods (Figure 1) and for
known bads (Figure 2). For known goods, estimated risk is skewed left with a thin right
tail (mean 0.206, median 0.158). For known bads, estimated risk is more uniform with
modes in both tails (mean 0.443, median 0.368). Thus most cases with high (low)
estimated risk were in fact bad (good).
The cumulative distribution functions (Figure 3) also show a clear separation. At
all points, the distribution of known goods is to the left of that of known bads.
Finally, the drop-out rate was 21 percent in 1988-96 and 36 percent in 1997. A
naïve prediction for the 1997 rate would have been 21 percent, but the model predicted
29 percent. Thus half the increase in drop-outs was due to changes in traits in the
model. Scoring does separate goods from bads, at least to some extent.
5.2 True rates
How well does the model separate? A lender would measure separation with
either true rates or predictive values (Hand, 1994; Kennedy, 1998). True rates are the
share of known goods (bads) predicted as goods (bads). The true positive rate is the
share of known goods predicted as goods, true positives / (true positives + false
negatives) (middle three rows of Table 7). In Figure 1, this is the area left of the
threshold divided by the total area. Likewise, the true negative rate is the share of18
known bads predicted as bads, true negatives / (true negatives plus false positives). In
Figure 2, this is the area right of the threshold divided by the total area.
For a range of thresholds, Figure 4 shows the true positive rate, the true
negative rate, and the true total rate, all trues divided by the size of the test sample.
For thresholds above 0.21, the true positive rate for the scoring model beats the all-
good naïve model (64 percent). Below 0.56, the true negative rate of the scoring model
beats the all-bad naïve model (36 percent). The true total rate exceeds the highest
naïve rate for thresholds above 0.19, with the greatest difference at a threshold of 0.45.
Figure 5 shows the trade-off between the true positive rate and the true negative
rate. The diagonal line is the trade-off in a naïve model that predicts some fixed
percentage as good. The scoring model has more power as its curve contains more area
above the diagonal; a perfect model would trace the upper and right borders, classifying
all known goods as goods and then all known bads as bads (Hand and Henley, 1997).
In fact, the scoring model is near the upper border for true positive rates below 0.5, and
near the right border for true negative rates below 0.2. For thresholds near zero (one),
the model hits a large share of goods (bads) and misses a small share of bads (goods).
5.3 Predictive value
A lender might also judge a model by its predictive value, the share of predicted
goods (bads) that are goods (bads). The positive predictive value is the share of
predicted goods that are known goods, true positives / (true positives + false positives)19
(bottom three rows of Table 7). This is the area left of the threshold in Figure 1 for
known goods divided by that same area plus the area left of the threshold in Figure 2
for known bads. The negative predictive value is the share of predicted bads that are
known bads, true negatives / (true negatives plus false negatives). This is the area
right of the threshold in Figure 2 for known bads divided by that same area plus the
area right of the threshold in Figure 1 for known goods.
For a range of thresholds, Figure 6 shows the positive predictive value, the
negative predictive value, and the total predictive value, equal to the total true rate.
The all-good naïve model has a positive predictive value of one, a negative predictive
value of zero, and a total predictive value of 0.64. Conversely, the all-bad naïve model
has a positive predictive value of zero, a negative predictive value of one, and a total
predictive value of 0.34. The scoring model has a higher total predictive value than the
best naïve model for thresholds above 0.19, with the greatest difference at 0.45.
By all measures, the scoring model predicts exit well. Its power is even more
remarkable because a lot of exit in 1997 was due to unprecedented change in the
market and because the model uses a small subset of the simple-to-observe data that
lenders often collect.20
6. Conclusion
Models that predict risk from traits of the borrower, the lender, and the loan are
a common way to reduce the costs of credit-card lenders, the microlenders of high-
income countries. But microlenders in low-income countries do not yet use scoring.
Can scoring help microlenders? The model here pinpointed a host of factors that
affect the likelihood of exit at a microlender in Bolivia. Furthermore, in out-of-sample
tests, the model predicts exit much better than naïve models.
In microlending, knowledge of characteristics from computers will not replace
knowledge of character and cash flows from personal contact. Scoring does, however,
show some promise as a way to mark which cases to check first. Most uses in practice
will probably focus on borrowers whose predicted risk is either very high (super-fails) or
very low (super-passes). For example, a lender might give loan officers a list each
month of the 10 borrowers in their charge who are most likely to exit and who thus
might deserve an extra visit or more encouragement.
Much work on scoring for microlending remains. Lenders will likely want to
model default, and they may also want to estimate the risk that a borrower x days in
arrears now will remain delinquent for at least y more days.
No one foresaw that scoring would replace individual analysis for consumer loans
in high-income countries (Lewis, 1990). Further work will show the extent to which
scoring can help cut the costs of microlending in low-income countries.21
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Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variable
0.01 0.021 -0.114 0.01 0.147 -0.812 0.460 1 Number of past loans
0.01 0.022 -0.148 0.01 0.155 -1.052 0.247 2
0.01 0.023 -0.186 0.01 0.165 -1.322 0.131 3
0.01 0.025 -0.225 0.01 0.175 -1.599 0.070 4
0.01 0.026 -0.212 0.01 0.187 -1.512 0.039 5
0.01 0.030 -0.271 0.01 0.213 -1.929 0.022 6
0.01 0.034 -0.262 0.01 0.243 -1.861 0.013 7
0.01 0.044 -0.338 0.01 0.313 -2.407 0.008 8
0.01 0.047 -0.312 0.01 0.334 -2.222 0.005 9
0.01 0.045 -0.302 0.01 0.321 -2.152 0.006 10 or more
0.636 0-6 Months since first loan
0.53 0.008 -0.005 0.53 0.057 -0.036 0.233 7-19
0.26 0.012 0.014 0.26 0.086 0.097 0.125 20-53
0.03 0.028 0.059 0.03 0.196 0.423 0.007 54-147
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE OF BORROWER24
Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variable
0.524 0 Longest spell in days
0.01 0.010 -0.063 0.01 0.069 -0.451 0.168 1     in all past loans
0.01 0.012 -0.045 0.01 0.085 -0.323 0.091 2
0.08 0.013 -0.022 0.08 0.090 -0.158 0.060 3
0.32 0.014 -0.014 0.32 0.097 -0.097 0.047 4
0.78 0.015 0.004 0.78 0.109 0.031 0.027 5
0.05 0.016 0.031 0.05 0.114 0.221 0.020 6
0.01 0.014 0.068 0.01 0.102 0.481 0.028 7
0.01 0.012 0.125 0.01 0.087 0.890 0.063 8-14
0.01 0.014 0.223 0.01 0.102 1.588 0.025 15-21
0.01 0.017 0.312 0.01 0.120 2.220 0.015 22-28
0.01 0.014 0.414 0.01 0.097 2.947 0.051 29 or more
0.524 0 Number of spells 
0.02 0.011 0.025 0.02 0.076 0.176 0.091 1     in previous loan
0.01 0.011 0.045 0.01 0.080 0.323 0.072 2
0.01 0.012 0.073 0.01 0.083 0.517 0.059 3
0.01 0.012 0.094 0.01 0.087 0.668 0.047 4
0.01 0.011 0.122 0.01 0.079 0.868 0.072 5 or 6
0.01 0.012 0.129 0.01 0.087 0.916 0.047 7 or 8
0.01 0.011 0.164 0.01 0.082 1.165 0.087 9 or more
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF PAST ARREARS25
Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variable
0.422 Male Sex
0.02 0.005 0.011 0.02 0.034 0.079 0.578 Female
0.473 Manufacturing Sector
0.01 0.006 -0.020 0.01 0.045 -0.146 0.527 Trade
0.36 0.026 0.023 0.36 0.183 0.167 0.006 Changed sector
0.01 0.000004 -0.000018 0.01 0.000030 -0.000130 676 Level Amount disbursed
0.01 0.000011 -0.000073 0.01 0.000078 -0.000520 140 Increase
0.11 0.000007 0.000012 0.11 0.000053 0.000085 25 Decrease
0.029 Other Guarantee
0.25 0.012 -0.014 0.25 0.087 -0.100 0.475 Personal
0.73 0.013 -0.004 0.73 0.090 -0.031 0.248 None
0.12 0.014 0.022 0.12 0.098 0.154 0.248 Multiple
0.93 0.008 -0.001 0.93 0.058 -0.005 0.100 Changed guarantee
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF SEX, SECTOR,
AMOUNT DISBURSED, AND GUARANTEE26
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE LOAN OFFICER
Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variable
0.054 Other
0.01 0.025 -0.138 0.01 0.176 -0.981 0.011 1
0.01 0.035 -0.132 0.01 0.248 -0.939 0.006 2
0.01 0.048 -0.128 0.01 0.340 -0.912 0.002 3
0.01 0.029 -0.128 0.01 0.209 -0.908 0.010 4
0.01 0.035 -0.122 0.01 0.251 -0.866 0.004 5
0.01 0.032 -0.107 0.01 0.225 -0.764 0.006 6
0.01 0.031 -0.103 0.01 0.221 -0.736 0.009 7
0.01 0.028 -0.097 0.01 0.201 -0.689 0.010 8
0.01 0.025 -0.096 0.01 0.175 -0.682 0.016 9
0.01 0.027 -0.094 0.01 0.194 -0.669 0.010 10
0.01 0.028 -0.074 0.01 0.201 -0.527 0.031 11
0.01 0.024 -0.073 0.01 0.173 -0.519 0.010 12
0.01 0.026 -0.071 0.01 0.183 -0.506 0.022 13
0.15 0.046 -0.068 0.15 0.331 -0.481 0.002 14
0.10 0.041 -0.067 0.10 0.291 -0.480 0.003 15
0.37 0.072 -0.064 0.37 0.514 -0.458 0.016 16
0.40 0.072 -0.061 0.40 0.514 -0.432 0.017 17
0.06 0.031 -0.059 0.06 0.222 -0.420 0.014 18
0.01 0.017 -0.048 0.01 0.121 -0.345 0.019 19
0.01 0.019 -0.048 0.01 0.134 -0.341 0.025 20
0.02 0.018 -0.043 0.02 0.128 -0.307 0.045 21
0.01 0.015 -0.041 0.01 0.107 -0.294 0.035 22
0.03 0.018 -0.039 0.03 0.129 -0.274 0.037 23
0.05 0.017 -0.034 0.05 0.123 -0.239 0.024 24
0.16 0.018 -0.025 0.16 0.128 -0.179 0.031 25
0.16 0.016 -0.022 0.16 0.113 -0.159 0.059 26
0.43 0.024 -0.019 0.43 0.168 -0.132 0.008 27
0.39 0.020 -0.018 0.39 0.144 -0.125 0.019 28
0.44 0.021 -0.017 0.44 0.153 -0.119 0.015 29
0.60 0.026 -0.014 0.60 0.186 -0.099 0.016 30
0.42 0.015 -0.012 0.42 0.110 -0.089 0.067 31
0.48 0.017 -0.012 0.48 0.122 -0.086 0.038 32
0.58 0.022 -0.012 0.58 0.153 -0.085 0.014 33
0.59 0.022 -0.012 0.59 0.155 -0.083 0.015 34
0.56 0.020 -0.012 0.56 0.143 -0.083 0.013 35
0.71 0.019 -0.007 0.71 0.137 -0.052 0.027 36
0.88 0.032 -0.005 0.88 0.229 -0.034 0.010 37
0.82 0.018 -0.004 0.82 0.131 -0.030 0.011 38
0.93 0.021 0.002 0.93 0.152 0.013 0.016 39
0.72 0.015 0.005 0.72 0.104 0.037 0.048 40
0.91 0.074 0.009 0.91 0.525 0.062 0.006 41
0.75 0.029 0.010 0.75 0.210 0.068 0.019 42
0.63 0.028 0.013 0.63 0.197 0.095 0.008 43
0.35 0.026 0.024 0.35 0.183 0.170 0.006 44
0.36 0.028 0.026 0.36 0.200 0.183 0.009 45
0.04 0.046 0.094 0.04 0.331 0.671 0.016 46
0.03 0.044 0.097 0.03 0.314 0.693 0.035 47
0.01 0.043 0.117 0.01 0.305 0.833 0.041 48
0.05 0.061 0.121 0.05 0.437 0.858 0.002 49
0.01 0.046 0.125 0.01 0.330 0.887 0.014 50
0.08 0.008 0.014 0.08 0.055 0.097 0.115 Changed loan officer27
Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variable
0.061 0-1 Experience of loan officer
0.50 0.009 0.006 0.50 0.066 0.045 0.204 2-6     in months
0.03 0.010 0.022 0.03 0.070 0.155 0.322 7-19
0.24 0.012 0.014 0.24 0.087 0.102 0.335 20-53
0.49 0.021 -0.014 0.49 0.147 -0.101 0.078 54-147
0.438 Other Branch
0.01 0.043 -0.231 0.01 0.304 -1.646 0.114 1
0.36 0.071 -0.064 0.36 0.504 -0.458 0.040 2
0.09 0.025 -0.043 0.09 0.178 -0.307 0.044 3
0.12 0.021 -0.032 0.12 0.149 -0.229 0.078 4
0.04 0.015 -0.030 0.04 0.104 -0.212 0.161 5
0.23 0.023 -0.028 0.23 0.165 -0.197 0.072 6
0.31 0.027 0.027 0.31 0.192 0.194 0.053 7
0.01 0.014 0.036 0.01 0.102 0.254 0.024 Changed branch
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE OF LOAN OFFICER AND BRANCH28
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF MONTH AND YEAR OF DISBURSEMENT
Change in prob. of exit Logit coefficients
p-value s.e. Estimate p-value s.e. Estimate Mean Independent variab
0.083 1988-1991 Year
0.02 0.011 -0.026 0.02 0.077 -0.185 0.086 1992
0.01 0.014 -0.078 0.01 0.097 -0.556 0.131 1993
0.01 0.016 -0.110 0.01 0.115 -0.782 0.198 1994
0.01 0.017 -0.068 0.01 0.123 -0.482 0.353 1995
0.4 0.020 -0.017 0.4 0.141 -0.119 0.150 1996
0.056 January Month
0.18 0.012 -0.016 0.18 0.083 -0.112 0.064 February
0.49 0.011 -0.008 0.49 0.078 -0.054 0.088 March
0.36 0.011 -0.010 0.36 0.078 -0.070 0.091 April
0.05 0.011 -0.021 0.05 0.077 -0.152 0.102 May
0.01 0.011 -0.029 0.01 0.078 -0.208 0.096 June
0.02 0.012 -0.027 0.02 0.082 -0.190 0.081 July
0.71 0.011 0.004 0.71 0.081 0.030 0.081 August
0.24 0.011 -0.013 0.24 0.080 -0.094 0.087 September
0.55 0.011 0.007 0.55 0.080 0.048 0.086 October
0.83 0.011 -0.002 0.83 0.080 -0.017 0.089 November
0.58 0.011 0.006 0.58 0.082 0.045 0.079 December29
Threshold
All-good All-bad
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Formula Criteria
6,794 6,783 6,721 6,644 6,514 6,338 6,062 5,499 4,231 1,771 0 TP True positives
0 284 764 1,034 1,287 1,534 1,799 2,127 2,635 3,367 3,761 TN True negatives
3,761 3,477 2,997 2,727 2,474 2,227 1,962 1,634 1,126 394 0 FP False positives
0 11 73 150 280 456 732 1,295 2,563 5,023 6,794 FN False negatives
1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.81 0.62 0.26 0.00 TP/(TP+FN) True positive rate
0.00 0.08 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.70 0.90 1.00 TN/(TN+FP) True negative rate
0.64 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.36 (TP+TN)/N True total rate
0.64 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.82 1.00 TP/(TP+FP) Positive predictive value
1.00 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.62 0.51 0.40 0.36 TN/(TN+FN) Negative predictive value
0.64 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.36 (TP+TN)/N Total predictive value
Note: N=10,555. With 6,794 known goods and 3,761 known bads, the known-good rate is 0.64, and the known-bad rate is 0.36.
TABLE 7
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FIGURE 1
POPULATION-WEIGHTED PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
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FIGURE 3
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF ESTIMATED RISK
TO GO BAD FOR KNOWN BADS
AND TO STAY GOOD FOR KNOWN GOODS33
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THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN THE TRUE POSITIVE RATE






























AND TOTAL PREDICTIVE VALUE
FOR VARIOUS THRESHOLDS